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Parallel conscious functioning of the human brain 
"Emotional Regulation ↔ Multitasking Ability" 
 
 
Ishroop Singh Aneja (ICE University of Madras, Chennai, India)  
AE 24 Tagore Garden  
New Delhi – 110027 
India 
91-9818464849 
ishroop@mp2.cjb.net 
 
The concept of parallel conscious functioning of the human brain is an effort to study the potential of 
brain to work on more than one task in parallel & multitasking fashion. Dwelling down the ability of 
brain to multitask we suggest another parameter of personality that we call the "Switching Ability". 
Switching ability is defined as the capability of brain to voluntarily control the switching of thought 
from one cognition to another. This ability to switch thoughts is found to be the guiding force behind 
emotional regulation / control and is also positively correlated to the ability to concentrate on any 
cognitive task. Based on the switching ability we define the state in which a person is i.e.:  
    =>If switching is effective the person can think in normal state.  
    =>If this switching is more rapid a person is in a hyperactive state  
    =>If this switching is low or none (not possible at will) the person enters a mania state (depressed 
state). 
We therefore propose the switching ability to be used for treatment of emotional (BPD), personality 
(attention) and mood disorders including stress. The treatment gets it roots from the prevailing 
distraction / imagery therapy of CBT. 
For details please refer to http://www.freewebs.com/ishroop  
 4
 
From life to cognition: from metabolic to behavioral autonomy. 
 
Xabier E. Barandiaran. 
Information, Autonomy and Systems Research Group, 
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, 
University of the Basque Country, 
Spain. 
 
Throwing away the central role played by representations on the characterization of cognitive processes  
within the cognitivist paradigm leaves non-representational approaches with the issue of how to justify 
the specificity of cognitive processes. More specifically put the question is:  how do we draw the 
boundaries between the cognitive and the non-cognitive dynamical systems? Francisco Varela's work 
on biological autonomy stands for one of the most complete post-cognitivist, biologically inspired and 
dynamical frameworks to characterize cognition. Nonetheless it is still unclear what the relation is 
between life and cognition within the autopoietic-enactive framework while the emphasis on closure 
and conservation severely limits the autopoietic interpretation of current situated and dynamical system 
perspectives. We review Varela's notion of autonomy in behavioral systems putting interactive 
dynamics at the core of cognitive activity and substituting the qualitatively notion of closure by that of 
a quantitatively complexity-asymmetry between internal (neural) and interactive dynamics. We further 
develop a minimal characterization of cognition in terms of the autonomy of a metabolically decoupled 
recursive dynamical system (that of the nervous system) embodied and situated in the biological 
domain but dynamically underdetermined by it. This underdetermination opens a space of dynamic 
sensorimotor freedom upon which behavioral dynamic structures are created and accommodated on a 
developmental process that generates cognitive identity. Agency is characterized by the quantitatively 
notion of complexity-asymmetry between internal and interactive dynamics in the maintenance of 
behavioral structures. The web of stability dependencies created between these structures provides the 
basis for a genuine cognitive self-construction and normativity (an specific source of value and sense-
making different from its adaptive biological substrate). We show how current simulation models on 
evolutionary robotics and neural-complexity based analytical tools provide an experimental framework 
for a further development of this characterization. 
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An ecological model for understanding and influencing behaviour in virtual communities 
 
 Jonathan Bishop 
University of Glamorgan 
 
Virtual communities are constructed by the individuals that use them. There are several types of users 
that carry out actions in these environments, the most differing of which are lurkers, who do not 
participate; and elders, who take a leading role. This paper proposes an ecological model to describe 
what drives such individuals to carry out an action such as helping another community member (level 
1), the cognitive elements that enable them to choose to carry out that action (level 2) and the means by 
which they perceive their environment and go about carrying out the action through external 
representations that offer affordance (level 3). Finally the model is applied to the problem of 
encouraging members to participate by discussing the methods by which people can be persuaded to 
participate by changing the way they interpret their desires and their environment. Future research is 
recommended to further investigate the role of an actor’s beliefs and plans in perceiving affordances 
and the beliefs of specific virtual community members to further investigate the effect these beliefs 
have on them carrying out actions such as posting messages.  
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Symbols without rules: A computational model of language acquisition using distributional 
analysis 
 
Steve Croker (s.croker@derby.ac.uk) 
Centre for Psychological Research in Human Behaviour 
School of Education, Health & Sciences 
University of Derby, DE3 9GX 
 
There has been much debate over the ability of connectionist models to support constructivist accounts 
of language acquisition.  Symbolic models, however, have not received as much attention.  There tend 
to be two types of computational approaches to language – those that attempt to solve a particular 
problem within the domain and those that attempt to inform our knowledge of the empirical data.  
MOSAIC (Model Of Syntax Acquisition In Children) is a symbolic computational model of early 
grammatical development that represents both approaches.  MOSAIC has been used to explain a 
number of errors that children make, including optional infinitive errors, case-marking errors, 
agreement errors and negation errors.  MOSAIC extracts distributional information from large 
naturalistic datasets, which enables an understanding of the data and also provides a learning 
mechanism that can go some way toward explaining how children acquire language.  The model 
constructs a network consisting of nodes that represent words or sequences of words present in the 
input.  It is sensitive to the distributional properties of items occurring in the input and is able to create 
‘generative’ links between words that occur frequently in similar contexts, building pseudo-categories.  
The only information received by the model is that present in the input corpus.  Some of the errors 
children make in their early multi-word speech can be explained by rote learning.  Others can be 
simulated by utilising the generative links to create novel utterances. The pattern of children’s speech 
errors can be explained without assuming domain-specific knowledge of linguistic structure, suggesting 
that any claim that this pattern can be taken as evidence for innate grammatical knowledge is too strong 
and that at least some aspects of children’s early language can be explained in terms of a distributional 
analysis of the statistics of the language being learned. 
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Empty Shells: Elementary Particles of Creativity 
 
Tom Erez, Anna Deters, Uri Hershberg and Sorin Solomon, Fondazione ISI and Yale University 
 
In recent years the question of creativity has gained increased scholarly attention, particularly in the 
field of cognitive science.  Many theoretical approaches have attempted to address the vastness and 
complexity of the phenomenon of human creativity.  Seeking a mechanism that describes some of the 
fundamental cognitive processes underlying idea formation, we propose the theory of “empty shells”. 
 
In the associative “network” of ideas and concepts of our mind, the empty shell is a node with no title 
and no content, a would-be idea.  This pre-concept has, however, a well-defined neighbourhood, 
linking together several ideas. Thus, it is endowed with meaning solely by its context (i.e., location in 
the network).  Subsequently, the empty shell is "filled" with content acquired directly from its 
neighbours.  We hypothesize that creativity in symbolic domains (e.g. advertising, stories, jokes, and so 
forth) can be represented through the dynamics of such empty shells. 
 
The synthetic operation of adding an empty shell is in itself devoid of radicalness. Thus, the 
juxtaposition of existing concepts may take place unawares, and allow the ideation process to proceed 
without confrontation with inhibitory facilities such as self-criticism.  Yet, by its mere appearance at a 
specific locale and its subsequent filling, the empty shell may provoke the generation of a new idea, to 
be presented later to the conscious mind with seeming instantaneity.  This being said, the empty shell 
phenomenon may be the source of creative “inspiration”, a means to shortcut of potential creative 
blocks by "tunnelling under" them (as opposed to facing and overcoming them). 
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Post-modular developmental psychology: re-conceptualising participation, membership and 
mastery of language. 
 
Michael Forrester 
Department of Psychology 
University of Kent 
Canterbury 
 
 
By way of contributing to the emergence of a post-cognitivist developmental psychology this paper 
considers ethnomethodologically informed notions of participation and membership during early 
parent-child interaction.  To this end a number of ideas originally outlined by Garfinkel and Sacks 
(1970) are presented, and by way of extension and clarification, discussed with reference to transcript 
extracts from everyday interactions between two parents and their pre-school child1.  The proposal is 
that membership, or what might constitute being a member, involves possessing a mastery of language 
and being able to produce and recognise glossing practices – defined as ‘assemblages of practices 
whereby speakers in the situated particulars of speech mean something different from what they can 
say in just so many words’.  The argument being proposed is that for post-cognitivist conceptions of 
interaction, a member is someone who recognises that the actions which make conversations possible 
are reflexively accountable practices. By looking at extracts where a child is ‘learning how to talk’, 
evidence is provided in support of the suggestions that: (a) membership is a dynamic and concerted 
accomplishment in context; (b) adults often treat children as ‘good-enough’ members; and (c) infants 
can attain membership status not only with reference to displaying a mastery of language, but also by 
displaying a mastery of communication.   
Discussion concludes by noting that one of Garfinkel and Sacks’ (1970) particular insights was 
that in displaying mastery of language speakers display membership, but mastery of language is itself a 
concerted accomplishment in occasion precisely because speakers display membership by not drawing 
attention to the fact that they are indeed a member.  Observations on what we can surmise from 
ethnomethodological informed post-cognitivist notions of membership are drawn out, particularly with 
respect to contemporary notions of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity.  
 
 
Reference: 
 
Garfinkel, H. and H. Sacks (1970). On formal structures of practical actions. Theoretical sociology: 
Perspectives and developments. J. C. T. McKinney, E. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
                                                 
1 Data extracts are taken from a longitudinal single-case study of a child learning how to talk between 1 and 3.6 years of age 
(ESRC Award ref: RES-000-22-0068).  
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Descartes, all over again 
 
Nathalie Gontier 
 
Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders 
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science 
Free University of Brussels 
Pleinlaan 2 
1050 Brussels 
Belgium 
Nathalie.Gontier@vub.ac.be  
Tel: 02.629.27.84 
 
 
 
 
 
This scheme represents the way in which knowledge in general is comprehended in Western society.  
Quine was the last one to state that the reference problem consisted of (1) searching for the relation 
between neural input and observational sentences and (2) the relation between observational sentences 
and theories.  Because of the second part of his thesis, part of language got reduced and repressed to the 
community, resulting in an ontological relativism, leading the way to Sociology of Knowledge.  
Concerning the first part of his thesis: Developments within neuroscience have shown that the neural 
input we receive, does not carry any language labels.  Therefore Evolutionary Epistemology was born, 
which states that the only thing we are sure of is that we, as organisms, live and interact with an 
environment.  Not by being conscious about it, nor by thinking the relation, but by living it.  We know 
that our silent/unconscious neural processes partly respond to stimuli from the environment.  We do 
however not know what the link between these silent processes and language/conscious thought is.  
And to know what the link between language and the environment consists of, is to study it, via these 
non-linguistic processes.  It will be argumented that the distinction made between language and non-
language roughly consists with the distinction between consciousness/unconsciousness and the mind 
first/body first dichotomy.  Western thinking now studies knowledge, and knowledge gaining from 
within the body, through silent unconscious (neural) routes, thereby raising questions like whether 
there is something like (un)consciousness.  It will be argumented that all we have done is reverse and 
repeat Descartes scheme, we should try and think beyond this dichotomy. 
 
 
? 
environment  Non-language 
language community 
? 
EE 
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Emotion as implicit evaluations 
 
C. Herrera Perez, 
Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
Emotion theory has for a long time debated the role of cognition and representation in the 
appraisal process. This debate has given rise to cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion. Cognitive 
theories claim that an evaluation, perhaps unconscious but a cognitive process with propositional 
content, is the source of emotional responses. Perceptual theories do not deny such evaluation, but, 
rather than claiming emotion is its result, they claim that emotion is itself a form of non-propositional 
evaluation. "Affective judgements may be fairly independent, and precede in time, the sorts of 
perceptions and cognitive operations commonly assumed to be the basis of these affective judgements" 
(Zajonc 1980). This question has been clarified by Frijda (1993) by distinguishing content and eliciting 
conditions (antecedent) of emotional appraisal. The content or significance of emotions is not a 
reflection of the eliciting conditions. This paper investigates the nature of the implicit cognitions that 
underlie the appraisal process.  
For some authors, this form of cognition is better described as subjective: it signifies more the 
state of the agent that any objective property of the world ("mind-to-world direction of fit" and conative 
orientation, Searle 1983). Pure cognition, on the other hand, is objective because it signifies properties 
of the world. One of the founding notions in post-cognitive psychology is nevertheless to consider 
agent and world as a whole system. In this view, the emotions are informative of world and agent as a 
coupled system, and not of any of the two as an objective entity – agents are situated. 
One of the main empirical fields in this new approach is situated robotics. By designing robots 
that are coupled with the environment and which react dynamically to environmental stimuli we can 
explore the principles of situated behaviour. In this presentation we will present an experiment with 
Khepera robots, evolved in simulation to develop emotional responses (following a dynamic model of 
appraisal, Herrera 2005). This experiment will demonstrate the nature of the implicit evaluations 
involved in appraisal. The evolved robot, guided by a neural controller with no propositional content, 
has the task of approaching an object whilst avoiding a predator: both entities, nevertheless, produce 
undistinguishable stimuli. The robot’s actions and internal values are sufficient to distinguish between 
three different emotions, desire, fear and joy, which lie between the coupled relationship between agent 
and world. In particular, they can be considered non-objective forms of categorisation of the world 
(fear-predator, joy-target object).  
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The elusiveness of cognition.   
Erik Hollnagel  
CSELAB, Department of Computer and Information Science  
University of Linköping, Sweden  
Email: eriho@ida.liu.se  
 
The escape from the constraining influence of behaviourism was primarily due to the  appearance of 
the information processing paradigm and specifically the digital computer.  Although the latter 
provided a powerful metaphor for thinking about mental processes,  it soon itself became as 
constraining as behaviourism had been. Cognition was treated  either as information processing or, at 
best, as an epiphenomenon of information  processing. Since it was commonly agreed, at least by the 
mainstream of research, that  human information processing was not only necessary but also sufficient 
to understand  human action, the study of cognition also became dominated by ‘cognition in the mind’.  
Although studying cognition under reasonably controlled conditions has a respectable  pedigree in the 
history of psychology, it was gradually realised that the study of  cognition could not be pursued 
without including the socio-technical context. The need  to understand cognition as more than a mental 
process and to study it under more  natural conditions led to a development that in the 1980s and 1990s 
culminated in the  formulation of the principles for ‘cognition in the wild’.  
 
Although the two approaches differ considerably, both take for granted that there is  some underlying 
process called cognition that it is meaningfully to study. Yet cognition  can also be seen as an aspect of 
what people do, rather than as something that goes on in  their individual or collective minds. In this 
view of cognition as control, the main  interest is in finding out what the regularities of performance are 
and how they can best  be described and explained. In contrast to human information processing it is 
not  assumed a priori that cognition, whether human or artificial, is the most important  determinant. 
The bulk of the evidence from studies of joint systems at work, indeed,  lends support to the view that 
the influence of working conditions and the situation as a  whole are greater than the influence of 
cognition seen as the processes of thinking and  reasoning. The unit of analysis must therefore be the 
performance characteristics of the  joint cognitive system rather than the cognition that may – or may 
not – go on inside.  
 
This view forms the basis of cognitive systems engineering, and the paper will outline  how this can be 
turned into practical guidance for research.  
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Simple distributional accounts can explain key language phenomena 
 
Gary Jones (g.jones@derby.ac.uk) 
Centre for Psychological Research in Human Behaviour 
School of Education, Health & Sciences 
University of Derby, DE3 9GX 
  
One of the simplest methods of examining language acquisition is to see to what extent child language 
phenomena can be explained solely from the input the child receives. This approach works on the 
premise that mechanisms need only be created for phenomena that lie outside what can be explained by 
the input. MOSAIC (Model of Syntax Acquisition in Children) represents a constructivist 
computational model of such an approach, utilising very simple mechanisms to provide what is largely 
a simple distributional account of the input. In contrast to many computational models of language 
acquisition, MOSAIC is trained on large-scale naturalistic speech (the mother’s utterances from 
mother-child interactions), producing child-like utterances that enable easy comparison to the data. 
Two areas of language acquisition are compared here: vocabulary acquisition and verb learning. The 
acquisition of vocabulary represents a key phenomenon in language acquisition, but is still poorly 
understood. Gathercole and Baddeley (1989) claim that the phonological store, one of the components 
of working memory, offers a critical mechanism for learning new words. Simulations show that 
MOSAIC can account for the nonword repetition task described by Gathercole and Baddeley (1989), a 
task often presented as a powerful diagnostic of vocabulary learning. The verb-island hypothesis 
(Tomasello, 1992) states that children’s early grammars consist of sets of lexically-specific predicate 
structures (or verb-islands). However, Pine, Lieven and Rowland (1998) have found that children’s 
early language can also be built around lexical items other than verbs, such as pronouns (contradicting 
a strict version of the verb-island hypothesis). Simulations show that the output from MOSAIC: (1) 
more closely resembles the child’s data than the child’s mother’s data on which MOSAIC is trained; 
and (2) can readily simulate both the verb-island and other-island phenomena which exist in the child’s 
data. Taken as a whole, MOSAIC provides a powerful distributional account of the data that is able to 
simulate several key phenomena in language acquisition. 
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Pragmatic features of child-directed speech facilitate language acquisition in multiple domains:  
The case of diminutives. 
 
Vera Kempe 
University of Stirling 
 
 In many languages, child-directed speech (CDS) is characterised by pragmatic elements that 
convey endearment and affection. One such element is the diminutive. I will present cross-linguistic 
evidence showing that, in addition to their pragmatic function, diminutives facilitate language 
acquisition in children. A series of elicitation experiments shows that 3-4 year old Russian and Serbian 
children produce fewer gender agreement and case-marking errors with diminutives compared to 
simplex nouns suggesting that diminutives facilitate the acquisition of inflectional morphology. 
Similarly, adult second language learners of Russian show faster learning and better generalisation of 
gender agreement when trained on diminutive, rather than simplex, nouns. These benefits are assumed 
to come about because diminutives tend to regularise inflectional patterns, and because they constitute 
a morpho-phonologically homogeneous word cluster which serves as a low-level schema (Dabrowska, 
2004). Furthermore, implicit learning experiments with native English speakers show that exposure to 
pseudo-words resembling Dutch and Russian diminutives facilitates word segmentation, mainly due to 
the invariance in word endings induced by diminutive suffixes. Thus, diminutives provide 
distributional cues which aid children in statistical learning on multiple levels. 
 
 Given the pervasiveness of diminutives in CDS, I will also address the question as to why these 
pragmatic elements can acquire such a prominent status in the CDS of some languages. I propose that 
pragmatic elements used by the adult to express positive affect will be reinforced by the child if they 
facilitate statistical learning and language acquisition. This, in turn, will encourage imitation by the 
adult to maintain communicative rapport. It might in fact only take a small initial statistical benefit 
from some affectively coloured pragmatic element to engage a communicative feedback loop that will 
amplify the frequency of that element in CDS. This idea supports a dynamic systems perspective which 
emphasises mutual interaction between language acquisition and adult-child communication. 
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Animate and/or Inanimate: “The Psychology of (Everyday) Things”* 
 
Sandy Lovie, School of Psychology, University of Liverpool 
 
Abstract 
The relationship between the animate and the inanimate has always been ambiguous in the sense that, 
for many, the inanimate seemed little more than an extension of the animate, for example, hand tools 
which are often characterised as augmenting natural physical abilities, while others argued for an 
absolute distinction between the living and the non-living. What I want to argue in this paper is for a 
rich integration of the animate and the inanimate, where each reciprocally, and mutualistically, creates 
and influences the other. Although this notion has some novelty as far as psychology is concerned, it 
has been accepted in one form or other in sociology and related disciplines for some time (see work by 
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, for instance, dating from the 1990s). 
 
My present purpose is to outline a psychological take on this integration by arguing for a heavily 
augmented neo-Gibsonian/neo-Skinnerian position, whereby the distinctive properties of each are used 
by the other to create this synthesis, resulting in the holistic generation of something which is different 
from the parts. For example, you will sometimes find the message “OUCH” written in the dirt very 
close to where a car has received some damage, or the admonition “DIRTY PLEASE CLEAN ME” on 
the back of a grimy white van. Here the inanimate has been given a (morally freighted) voice by the 
animate in order to jointly signal a social breech and achieve an appropriate action, both being aspects 
of the situation which would not have emerged without the voicing. And, symmetrically, without the 
damage or the dirt, the moral messages would not have been proffered, or even thought necessary. This 
analysis will be illustrated by a range of voicings from the memorial messages on the benches dotted 
around the Malvern Hills to a body fat monitor. 
 
*Donald Norman, 1988 
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Embodiment in emotion metaphors; its universality and variety 
Yoshihiro Matsunaka1 and Kazuko Shinohara2 
(1Tokyo Polytechnic University, 2Tokyo University of Agriculture & Technology) 
ymats@bas.t-kougei.ac.jp 
 
Emotion metaphor has been one of the most argued conceptual metaphors since Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980). Recent trend in this field covers both the pursuit of universality and the consideration of cross-
linguistic or cross-cultural variety. This study explores cross-linguistic variety of emotion metaphors by 
analyzing examples from English and Japanese, and claims that these languages share several 
conceptual metaphors of emotion, though certain differences can be found between them.  
Among previous studies, Kövecses (2000, 2002) compares emotion metaphors in many different 
languages, arriving at a universal master metaphor; EMOTION IS FORCE. He explains the cross-
linguistic similarity in emotion metaphors (e.g. EMOTION IS INTERNAL PRESSURE IN A 
CONTAINER) in terms of the physiological processes (e.g. blood and its pressure) that all people share 
when they have the same emotion. To this well-known blood-oriented analysis, our previous studies 
(Matsunaka & Shinohara (2001, 2003, 2004) and Shinohara & Matsunaka (2003)) add other source 
domains for emotion metaphors in Japanese; the digestive system (EMOTION IS THE DIGESTIVE 
SYSTEM) and meteorological phenomena (EMOTION IS METEOROLOGICAL PHENOMENA). 
This paper argues that these metaphors have some physiological motivations that might be peculiar to 
the Japanese, suggesting that physiological motivations can be language/culture-specific in contrast 
with universal nature of embodiment as discussed earlier in the field of cognitive semantics. In order to 
examine this claim and see whether those emotion metaphors are really peculiar to Japanese, this paper 
analyzes the data of other languages (especially English) and discusses that emotion metaphors which 
are often found in Japanese data are not quite unique to the Japanese language and can be seen in other 
languages while there is also difference. We attribute this similarity and difference to the difference of 
elaboration of this metaphor and the difference of original physiological (embodied) experience.  
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The reification of phonological storage: Short-term memory as a sensory-effector system 
Bill Macken and Dylan Jones 
School of Psychology, Cardiff University 
Contact: Macken@Cardiff.ac.uk 
 
Traditionally, performance on verbal short-term memory tasks is seen as being based on the operation 
of a bespoke, temporary phonological storage system. This store is generally regarded as a cognitive 
‘primitive’ and its functioning is seen as determining proficiency of higher order functions such as 
language, reasoning, and mental arithmetic. In this paper we show that key empirical phenomena 
argued to reflect the operation of such a store can be exhaustively accounted for by processes 
associated with speech output planning and auditory perceptual organisation, without recourse to the 
notion of temporary phonological storage. For example, we show that the influence of ‘phonological’ 
similarity on short-term memory performance (poorer serial recall of similar sounding material relative 
to dissimilar) is due to the joint action of errors in speech planning (articulatory similarity) and 
perceptual organisation (acoustic similarity). We also show that the influence of long-term linguistic 
knowledge (e.g., effects of frequency, lexicality, neighbourhood density) on short-term verbal memory 
(usually taken to reflect lexical redintegration of partially decayed temporary phonological 
representations) may be parsimoniously explained in terms of effects of articulatory (especially co-
articulatory) fluency, again without recourse to temporary phonological representation. We present an 
account of performance on short-term verbal memory tasks which emphasises the flexible co-opting of 
linguistic skill and perceptual affordance as determinants of that performance that obviates the need to 
posit temporary phonological storage. 
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Playing the game of go without representations 
Magnus Persson, Max Planck Institute 
 
Computer go is difficult. In contrast to chess the long term challenge for computer go programmers 
today is to the beat the average player in any amateur go club. 
 
A typical go program today builds complex representations of the game state using algorithms specific 
to go in order to evaluate a position. As a consequence most go programs rely on knowledge rather 
than full board search to play well. 
 
Recently many go programmers and researchers have started to use a radically different approach: 
Monte Carlo go (MCG). The purest form of MCG is a program that plays 1000’s of random games 
from the current position. A MCG program selects the move that won most of the games from the 
current position.  
 
The MCG approach works very well on a 9x9 go board and smaller, and the playing strength is a 
challenge for any beginner. The moves played are often strategically profound (for a computer 
program). The moves played in tactical fights have good shape (good style), although the moves do not 
always work. In summary, pure MCG plays robust go. Although the moves played are not the best, 
they are rarely very bad.  
 
Pure MCG can be improved by adding simple but fundamental go knowledge. The program, Viking, 
can compete with state of art computer go programs and human beginners, without any complex 
representations. 
 
MCG programs cannot be seen as plausible models of how humans play go. However it can be argued 
that the knowledge used by humans to play go is not used to build mental representations nor is it 
systematic search. Rather, robust move selection by humans, is strongly influenced by a partially 
random search guided by fundamental knowledge that avoids severe mistakes.  
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Semantic memory as a system for deriving function 
Fiona Phelps and Bill Macken 
School of Psychology, Cardiff University 
Contact: PhelpsFG1@Cardiff.ac.uk 
 
 
Many contemporary accounts of semantic memory conceive of meaning in terms of abstract, amodal 
featural representations, such that the meaning of a given concept is given by activation of a set of such 
defining features for that concept within a unitary semantic space (e.g., Caramazza et al, 1990; Tyler & 
Moss, 2001; Devlin et al., 1998). On the other hand, embodied accounts of meaning (e.g., Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000; Gibbs, 2003) emphasise the importance of knowledge modality, such that meaning 
emerges from grounded perception and action. In this paper, we show that modality is a critical aspect 
of semantic processing, and in particular, we argue that functional knowledge has a privileged role in 
meaning in two respects: First, functional knowledge about a concept is more readily accessed than 
sensory knowledge, and second, functional knowledge becomes activated in an obligatory fashion 
whenever any semantic judgment is made about a concept. For example, in a speeded feature 
verification task (is <feature x> true of CONCEPT A?), judgments about functional features were made 
more quickly than judgments about sensory features. Further, a second functional judgment about a 
given concept was facilitated to an equal degree by both a prior, different functional judgment and a 
prior sensory judgment, suggesting that functional knowledge was activated obligatorily when the 
initial sensory judgment was made. On the other hand, while prior functional judgments did facilitate 
later sensory decisions about a concept, they did so to a lesser degree than did prior sensory 
judgements. These results suggest an asymmetric, modality-based organisation of meaning, such that 
an object’s function is the primary determinant of its meaning, and further that the activation of that 
functional knowledge is the purpose of the semantic system, such that functional knowledge becomes 
obligatorily activated whenever any semantic processing takes place.  
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Time as a Factor for Semantic Motivation in Grammatical Structure 
Dr Yanna B. Popova 
University of Oxford  
Hertford College 
Oxford OX1 3BW 
yanna.popova@hertford.oxford.ac.uk 
 
 
Interest in the bodily/biological mechanisms underlying human cognition has produced in the last 
twenty years a view of language as an embodied system closely connected with cognition and action. A 
linguistic framework called cognitive linguistics claims, among other things, that language is not 
describable without essential reference to cognitive processing and that grammar is inherently 
symbolic. Within a cognitive framework this presentation aims to explore the question of the 
relationship between semantic content and particular linguistic classes or, in other words, the 
conceptual foundations of grammatical structure. Following work by Givon (1979, 1984) and 
Langacker (1987), it argues that linguistic categories are experientially motivated and thus represent 
conceptions grounded in everyday experience: sensory, kinaesthetic, and emotive. According to Givon 
(1979), the main grammatical classes reflect a scale of temporal stability from most stable (nouns), to 
relatively stable (adjectives), to these denoting change (verbs). A more interesting and largely 
unnoticed claim by Givon is his observation that in human conceptualization time occupies a privileged 
position in relation to space: while temporal entities exist outside of space, spatial entities exist in both 
time and space. 
Contrary to more recent claims that the spatialization of time dominates the way we think and speak of 
it, I will argue that time is in fact fundamental to our understanding of entities and events (including 
motion). Our experience of temporal entities need make no reference to space while our experience of 
spatial entities cannot exist without reference to time. The significance of this observation will be 
elaborated in terms of its consequence for grammatical structure. 
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Dialogism and Psychology: Towards a conjunct principle of mind 
 
Colin T Schmidt 
Sorbonne University & Le Mans University 
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Symbols and rules psychology is no longer en vogue as a way of explaining human thinking (pace J. 
Fodor, N. Chomsky, etc.). Embodiment (F. Varela, the epigenetic robotics movement, etc.) has been a 
concept on the rise in the study of mental phenomena ever since H.L. Dreyfus splashed his critique of 
artificial reason (1972) all over the Artificial Intelligence field. And in spite of the light other branches 
of cognitivism have been able to shed on the problem of demonstrating mental activity through 
simulation techniques or simply by "explaining the myth of it away" with the help of materialistic 
theories (i.e. the Churchlands), philosophers taking into account the dialogical essence of our being (P. 
Ricoeur, F. Jacques, R. Harré, Taylor, etc.) and/or the interest of the concepts of reference and relation 
(Jacques, Putnam, Russell, Sir P.F. Strawson) have immensely increased seductive illustrations of the 
discursive nature of our minds. Just as cognitivism represents post-behaviourism, the author fully 
believes that obtaining a full definition of the conjunct principle of mind based on these recent 
discursive theoretical developments will be the turning point in establishing a veritable post-cognitivist 
psychology. The intention at the Conference in Glasgow is to attempt a definition of this principle 
using familiar Systems Science and Set Theory techniques along with lesser familiar philosophical 
pragmatics. Augmenting the attention humans allot to the dialogical aspect of their lives is meant to 
combat the individualism that leads to absurd uses of scientific knowledge. As so, the author seeks to 
challenge the widely approved idea of simulating phenomena from the realm of human mental life by 
applying his post-cognitivist principle of mind to one of Man's obsessions. Negating human will to 
simulate oneself through reductio ad absurdum logic would definitively change the face of Psychology 
as we know it today: it will annul one of the reasons we use its theories. 
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In this paper, I will investigate the importance of bodily action for spatial perception. Piloting of the 
body through space requires that spatial perception is a plastic and continuous process with visuotactile 
representations constantly being updated. This implies that the perception of space is not a ‘purely 
perceptual’ function, but should be understood as being action-oriented. Spatial perception is the result 
of the integration of proprioceptive, somatosensory and visual information with information about the 
external environment in a use- or task-dependent way. I will illustrate this point by looking at recent 
work on the relation between tool use and (spatial) cognition. It appears, for instance, that the active 
manipulation of tools in extrapersonal space extends the neural representation of peripersonal space, in 
normal subjects as well as neglect and extinction patients. These findings offer, I submit, further 
support for the approach known as situated cognition: it does not suffice, for explanatory purposes, to 
focus exclusively on the representational and computational processes that take place in the brain. 
Perception-action couplings are crucial for spatial cognition. In fact, I also claim that the evidence 
presented strongly suggest that the tools used, and the actions they afford, should be taken as parts of 
the cognitive system. The view I defend has been labeled vehicle externalism, which is a relatively 
strong version of situated cognition. In this paper, I will also discuss and dismiss a number of 
objections that can be raised against vehicle externalism. 
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The Disambiguation of Disruptive Behavior: Self-regulation, Working Memory and Language 
 
John C. Schuremann 
 
The prima-facie plausibility of dynamical integrated, High Order intelligent distributed agency, with 
Low Order sensory-motor imputes, holds significant interest for contemporary neuroscience, 
psycholinguistics and philosophy.  Intrinsic to the issue, some persons consider such phenomena as a 
self evident, situated, and experiential reality. People with neurodevelopmental impairments lack the 
automasized capacity for perception or conceptualization of routine abilities normally taken for granite. 
Various Formal Symbolic Representational Processes, necessary for accomplishing social adaptation 
can be absent, often with out an articulated understanding by the person or society. Effective 
psychosocial functioning requires a relatively complete complement of representational competencies. 
Because of the function’s automasized nature, societies tendency to attribute pejorative qualities to 
persons with asynchronous neurological development prevalent.  Impaired persons struggling to 
survive and prosper with in an activity flow, which is felt as confusing, painful, and overwhelming, 
confront a confounding predicament.  Despite such adversities, some impaired, manage to 
naturalistically construct High Order compensatory strategies through a process of “boot strapping”.  
Generally, though, the morbidity of this population remains tragic and costly for both society and the 
afflicted. 
 
Contemporary psychotherapeutic perspectives, scientifically informed and driven have begun to 
disambiguate neurologically anomalistic behavior labeled by society as disruptive. The presentation 
will explore clinical utilization of intentionally constructed, High Order Self Monitoring systems of 
complex compensatory protocols with disruptive disorders.  Forms of augmented cognition include 
pharmacological agents, psychosocial scaffolding, assistive technologies, conceptual prosthesis’s and 
accommodations with in the social ecologies of the impaired.  The goal of treatment processes is the 
integration of multimodal interventions, as components of the patient’s cohesive self-narrative.  The 
treatment framework is dialogically narrative, incorporating self-directed intelligent agency with in a 
situated, real time process of psychosocial adaptation. 
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Diminutives aid the acquisition of case-marking in Serbian 
 
Nada Ševa1, 2 and Vera Kempe1 
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The acquisition of noun morphology in highly inflected languages like Russian, Serbian, or 
Polish includes learning the declension of nouns. Previous research demonstrated that diminutives (e.g., 
Stevie, doggy) facilitate the acquisition of case-marking in Russian and Polish (Kempe, 2005; 
Dabrowska, submitted).  
In this study, we extended the crosslinguistic comparison of the effects of diminutives to case 
acquisition in Serbian. Twenty-two children (mean age 3;7 years) were presented with 24 familiar and 
unfamiliar objects and a toy elephant, which was standing at, or moving away from an object. Half of 
the objects were labelled with masculine, and half with feminine nouns presented either as simplex 
forms or diminutive derivations. The unfamiliar objects were labelled with phonotactically legal 
Serbian non-words like frobinMAS (DIM:frobinić) or tompaFEM (DIM:tompica). The experimenter 
demonstrated the movement or position of the elephant followed by the questions Odakle ide slon? 
(Where does the elephant come from?) and Gde stoji slon? (Where does the elephant stand?) to elicit 
genitive and locative case production. 
The results revealed a main effect of noun familiarity, demonstrating that children produced 
more correct case marking for familiar nouns compared to novel nouns. In contrast to Russian and 
Polish, there was no main effect of derivational status, probably due to performance close to ceiling on 
familiar nouns. However, a two-way interaction between derivational status and familiarity showed that 
in the novel nouns, children made fewer errors with diminutives than with their simplex counterparts.  
This finding confirms a facilitative effect of diminutives on the acquisition of noun morphology 
in three languages. This effect shows that a form that is prominent in child-directed speech for semantic 
and pragmatic reasons can aid the acquisition of noun morphology because it promotes the extraction 
of lexically and phonologically homogeneous word clusters which serve as low-level schemas for the 
acquisition of inflectional morphology. 
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‘Representations of intended actions in children with DCD compared with their age matched 
peers and a younger developing group’. 
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This study aims to explore the hypothesis that children with Developmental Coordination Disorder 
(DCD) have difficulties in generating an accurate visuospatial representation of an intended action. The 
task, requiring decisions about correct object use (based on Chainay and Humphrey’s 2002) included a 
series of photographs (48 photographs, 4 photographs for each of the 12 objects) of the objects been 
used correctly or incorrectly.  The three types of incorrect usage that were used were: wrong grip, 
wrong spatial position or wrong object orientation and wrong context. The task involved detecting the 
correct use of the object and stating the reasons why the photographs were incorrect. Participants 
included three groups of children. Group 1 (n=28), mean age=118.16 months, involved children 
identified according to the DSM-IV criteria as having DCD. Group 2(n=24), mean age=121.17 months 
included an age matched control group randomly selected from school registers. Group 3(n=23), mean 
age=71 months provided a developmentally younger group for comparison. All children were assessed 
on the Movement ABC test and completed the task requiring decisions about correct object use. The 
results showed consistent differences between the DCD group and age matched controls on the overall 
score and for the incorrect grip usage. No differences were found on the incorrect spatial and content 
action.  When compared to younger children, the DCD group did not differ on the overall score of 
correct answers and incorrect grip and content action. When aged matched controls were compared to 
younger children significant differences were found on all measures. These results are discussed in 
terms of the core motor deficit and perceptual problems in children with DCD. 
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Cognitive Linguistics and L2 idiom instruction 
 
Sophia Skoufaki , University of Cambridge. 
 
Idiom theorists have made two proposals for idiom instruction. Cognitive Linguists have explored 
experimentally the traditional proposal, the presentation of idioms in thematic groups (e.g. Boers 
2000). Their experiments indicate that presenting figurative language in groups according to the 
Conceptual Metaphors thought to underlie them leads to better form retention than their presentation in 
terms of functional groups. The more recent proposal is to ask learners to guess at the meaning of 
idioms before presenting them with their definitions. Although Cognitive Linguists have supported it 
theoretically (e.g. Kövecses and Szabó 1996), they have not tested it experimentally. Moreover, these 
proposals have not been compared in terms of their relative effectiveness. Another issue that has been 
ignored is that both methods seem to guide the learner’s attention to the meaning rather than to the 
form of the input. Therefore, a method focusing on the idioms’ form might lead to better form 
memorization. The study presented here aims to fill these research gaps. 
  
Greek adult advanced-level learners of English learn VP idioms incidentally in  three conditions. In all 
of them idioms appear in metaphoric groups. The second condition, moreover, begins with an idiom-
meaning guessing task. Conditions also differ in terms of the practice exercise following the input 
phase. In the first two conditions it draws attention to idiom meaning, while in the third more to the 
form than to the meaning of idioms. All conditions end with the test phase, a cloze test where some of 
these idioms are partly missing.  
 
Results indicate that starting VP-idiom instruction with a guessing task leads to higher form retention 
than the simple metaphoric-groups presentation. The results of the conditions differing in terms of their 
practice exercise do not differ significantly, suggesting that these comprehension-focused methods do 
not need to be complemented by production exercises.  
 
References 
Boers, F. 2000. Metaphor Awareness and Vocabulary Retention. Applied Linguistics 21(4), 553-571. 
Kövecses, Z. and Szabó, P. 1996. Idioms: A view from Cognitive Semantics. Applied Linguistics 17(3), 
326-355.    
 
 30
 
 31
 
Culturally Mediated Perception, Action, and Conceptualization: How Distributed Cognition 
Creates Intra-Cultural Similarities and Inter-Cultural Differences in Thinking. 
 
Norman Steinhart, University of Toronto 
Recent experimental research has shown that people living in North American and Asian cultures show 
significant differences in many fundamental perceptual processes such as change blindness and field 
dependence. (Nisbett and Masudo).  This paper will explore the significance of these findings for an 
understanding of the human mind as dependent  on socially learned, culturally mediated interaction 
processes, as well as on individual epigenetic development. I propose an elaboration of activity theory 
that can help us understand how the skills that allow us to use aspects of the outer world as a field or 
context to intentionally probe, understand, and transform our environment, by providing a common 
distal artifact/environment interface, bind various perceptions and viewpoints into coherent objects and 
concepts, and bind our intentional actions into unified selves. We will examine the possibility that 
sequential versus iconic processing such as encountered in western alphabet versus Chinese ideograms 
will preferentially and selectively develop specific brain/mental functions to be dominant, and so 
different systems of writing may lead to distinct ‘neuro-cultural circuits’. Therefore, ongoing use of 
culture-specific mediated perceptions and actions could lead to the generalization of culture-specific 
distributed cognition within each culture that helps account for Nisbett et al’s findings. As well, the 
cultural-dependent model of mind predicts that the complementary process of  socially shared 
cognition will occur within a cultural group. Tools, as well as language and material symbols embody 
people’s intentions. Tomasello  proposes that in learning the conventional use of cultural objects and 
activities, the child must learn to take on the viewpoint and intention of others, which greatly extends 
their innate ability to understand another's thinking. In effect, we employ certain aspects of the world as 
a 'common ground' that can serve as an external extra-personal ‘shared thought space’ rather than 
relying on private internal representations as our basic form of cognition.      
Nisbett, R. & Masudo, T. (2003). Culture and Point of View. PNAS, 100(19), 11163-11170. 
Tomasello, M. ( 1999) The Cultural Ecology of Young Children’s Interactions With Objects and 
Artifacts. In: Ecological Approaches to Cognition Edited by Wingrad E. 
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Unifying Approaches to the Unity of Consciousness 
 
Susan Stuart, 
Department of Philosophy, 
University of Glasgow 
 
My concern is with the binding problem and how information, that is stored across the brain, is 
integrated into one unitary conscious experience. I will draw together the common themes from a 
diverse body of work, including Cotterill's neurophysiological approach [1995, 1998], Kantian 
metaphysics [1929], Sloman's cognitive architecture theory [2003, 2004], Aleksander's engineering 
approach that entails the integration of cognitive faculties into architectures [2003], and robotics 
[Bowling et al. 1998, 2004]. 
 
Cotterill claims that consciousness is primarily associated with the necessary co-ordination of 
movement and response requiring a unity of conscious experience. In muscular movement we ask 
questions about our world and Cotterill suggests that a master node draws together afferent/efferent 
information into coherent thought and action, identifying the anterior cingulate as the possible 'site' 
where this activity occurs. Kant's critical philosophy focuses on describing the logically necessary 
prerequirements for a unity of consciousness, emphasising the role of the cognitive imagination in the 
act of synthesis. Like Cotterill, Kant is committed to an active, sensorimotorily enmeshed view of 
consciousness, realising the act of synthesis or binding in some embodied system. 
 
Early hybrid cognitive architectures represented knowledge symbolically as rules and facts but had a 
neurally-based activation process that determined which facts and rules got deployed in which 
situations. [Anderson 1983, 1990, 1993.] Sloman's Cog-Aff and H Cog-Aff architectures provide a 
more holistic approach, arguing that both cognitive and affective components must be combined in one 
architecture. Unlike early architectures H Cog-Aff is not algorithm and representation based.  In the 
robotics work of Bowling et al. the integration of information operates on the basis of probability 
algorithms which must occur in both a temporal and a spatial framework if the system is to act 
appropriately in real time. 
 
Embodiment, animation, perception, and imagination, are fundamental to each of these approaches, and 
these require a system that has (i) the ability to bind its experiences as experience for it, (ii) the ability 
to order its experience temporally, and (iii) some element of affective processing that makes some 
things more desirable than others and provides the system with a will to act. 
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Agency and communication 
 
Maurizio Tirassa 
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An agent is a conscious organism who lives in a situation, striving continuously to make it more to its 
liking. The situation is a dynamical landscape of meanings, that is, a subjective, open, and changeable 
representation of the world. Meanings are relational: they result from the interaction between the 
dynamics world and those of the agent's mind/brain; that each meaning depends on and contributes to 
the dynamics of the overall situation. For an agent to act is to interfere with the spontaneous dynamics 
of the world in some crucial joint, altering it so to try and improve the situation. 
A social agent is one whose possible actions include interfering with other agents' situations. Mentalist 
communication occurs when an agent overtly tries to interfere with another's situation, possibly letting 
him to do the same in reverse. Overtness means that a partial understanding of the other's situation 
becomes part of each agent's situation, so that each understands, accepts, and acknowledges the other's 
attempts to interfere with her situation. Communication thus becomes a circular and cooperative 
interference in each other's situation. Part of the evolution of each agent's situation is therefore subject 
to the scrutiny and the partial control of the other; this also accounts for various social phenomena, 
including face. The whole process is only possible between agents capable of mindreading and of 
externalizing a description of aptly selected features of their situations. 
Communicative actions are the external result of the processes outlined; whatever an agent interprets as 
an overt attempt to interfere with her situation (including silence where something else is expected) 
bears a communicative meaning. The semantic relations that an agent entertains with her situation may 
be divided into epistemic, motivational, and intentional; analogously, the modifications that an agent 
may induce in another's situation also belong to the same categories. 
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The mind is the control system of an agent's interaction with the world. Three perspectives can be 
adopted for the description of such interaction: from the outside (behaviorism), from nowhere 
(cognitivism), and from the inside. I will outline and defend the third perspective, couching it in a 
biological view of cognition. My main claims are: (1) the mind/brain is a conscious, representational 
organ; it is a material property of the body; (2) interaction can be understood in terms of 
representations plus agency; (3) cognitive causation goes from mind/brain "states" to mind/brain 
"states". The mind re-creates itself from instant to instant; each "slice" of this re-creation is generated 
by the preceding one; thus, each "slice" is literally the product of the previous history of that 
mind/brain. The patterns with which the mind/brain re-creates itself are rooted in the organism's 
evolutionary and individual history. Since interaction at t(n) depends on all the interactions at t(n-i), 
memory and learning can be understood as modifications of each possible future representation, rather 
than independent "cognitive functions". An organism's interaction consists in the relationship between 
its internal dynamics and the dynamics of the external world. The latter are the stream of events that are 
subjectively relevant to the orgamism, i.e., the contingencies and opportunities it "views" in the 
external world. The former are the flux of mental representations that "create" the external dynamics 
and control the organism's relationship to them. In a cognitively sophisticated ("metarepresentational") 
species like ours, the internal dynamics (i.e., the landscape of contingencies and opportunities 
represented by the mind) include the mind itself. This leads to several phenomena, including the 
possibility of a (partial) control of the mind over itself, the "internal narrative" that humans entertain, 
and other features of our cognitive and social life. 
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Spreading the Word: Linguistic Competence and the Extended Mind 
 
Michael Wheeler, University of Stirling 
 
In Reconstructing the Cognitive World, Michael Wheeler argues that we 
should turn away from the generically Cartesian philosophical 
foundations of much contemporary cognitive science research and proposes 
instead a Heideggerian approach. Wheeler begins with an interpretation 
of Descartes. He defines Cartesian psychology as a conceptual framework 
of explanatory principles and shows how each of these principles is part 
of the deep assumptions of orthodox cognitive science (both classical 
and connectionist). Wheeler then turns to Heidegger's radically 
non-Cartesian account of everyday cognition, which, he argues, can be 
used to articulate the philosophical foundations of a genuinely 
non-Cartesian cognitive science. Finding that Heidegger's critique of 
Cartesian thinking falls short, even when supported by Hubert Dreyfus's 
influential critique of orthodox artificial intelligence, Wheeler 
suggests a new Heideggerian approach. He points to recent research in 
"embodied-embedded" cognitive science and proposes a Heideggerian 
framework to identify, amplify, and clarify the underlying philosophical 
foundations of this new work. He focuses much of his investigation on 
recent work in artificial intelligence-oriented robotics, discussing, 
among other topics, the nature and status of representational 
explanation, and whether (and to what extent) cognition is computation 
rather than a noncomputational phenomenon best described in the language 
of dynamical systems theory. 
 
Wheeler's argument draws on analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, 
and empirical work to "reconstruct" the philosophical foundations of 
cognitive science in a time of a fundamental shift away from a 
generically Cartesian approach. His analysis demonstrates that 
Heideggerian continental philosophy and naturalistic cognitive science 
need not be mutually exclusive and shows further that a Heideggerian 
framework can act as the "conceptual glue" for new work in cognitive 
science. 
 
Michael Wheeler is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of 
Stirling. He was formerly Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of 
Dundee. 
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Symposium abstract 
 
This symposium on representation brings together three strands of post-cognitivist psychology: the 
ecological psychology of James Gibson; socio-cultural theory; and work on distributed cognition. 
Informed by a pragmatist sensibility, the papers explore the place of representational practices in post-
cognitivist psychology. Over the past fifteen years, the work of ecological psychologists has begun to 
converge with that of sociocultural and discursive researchers in the development of a non-cognitivist 
account of cognition (Edwards, 1997; Reed, 1991, 1996; Still & Good, 1998; Wertsch, del Rio & 
Alvarez, 1995). Cognitive scientists and philosophers have also begun to look beyond the boundaries of 
the skin in their attempts to formulate an approach to knowledge representation that is focused on the 
organism - environment transaction (Burke, 1994; Haugeland, 1998; Nersessian, 2005; Putnam, 1999; 
Rouse, 1996). A focus on the situated and embodied nature of cognition has also begun to challenge the 
individual representational theory of mind (Clancey, 1997 ; Clark, 1997).  The turn to practice has also 
helped focus attention away from the mental representations of the knower (Pickering, 1992; Schatzki, 
Knorr Cetina & von Savigny, 2001). While knowledge is now more likely to be seen as embodied and 
embedded in social and cultural  practices, such work can still be seen as new form of 
representationalism,  distributed among the collective rather than  located within the individual, a view 
advocated in the opening paper. Taking a cue from John Dewey's early critique of the spectator view of 
knowledge (Dewey, 1929) and James Gibson's radical attempt to transcend subject-object dualism 
(Gibson, 1979), the author maintains that there is a residual representationalism within socio-cultural 
approaches to cognition. It is argued that if we are to move beyond 'pre-post-cognitivism', we need to 
reject the subject-object dualism that keeps raising the seemingly fundamental 'problems' for which 
representationalism continues to be deemed the only answer. In the second paper, the authors contrast 
the traditional Cartesian cognitivist approach to representation with an approach that has its roots in the 
transactionalism of John Dewey and Arthur Bentley (Dewey and Bentley, 1949) and, more recently, in 
the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1992) and James Gibson (1979). Employing a notion of 'troc', 
borrowed from the art historian Michael Baxendall (Baxandall, 1985), a transactional account of 
knowledge in terms of representational practices that 'point both ways' - to organism and environment 
is presented. Because representations are used and evolve in the service of troc, this frame, the authors 
suggest, can in principle provide a full account of the use of representations. In the final paper, an 
attempt is made to move beyond the impasse between cognitive and socio-cultural accounts of 
scientific practice. The authors argue that nothing less than a reconceptualization of both 'cognition' and 
'culture' will be required such that each is implicated in the other. They find much promise in recent 
attempts within cognitive science to broaden the boundaries of the epistemic system. Drawing upon an 
extensive empirical project that uses ethnographic and cognitive-historical methodology to investigate 
the 'social-cognitive-cultural' practices of interdisciplinary research laboratories (Nersessian et al., 
 39
2003), the authors attempt to formulate new ways of understanding the nature of 'representation' in 
science, compatible with a distributed cognitive framework.  
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The 'antithesis' of the subjective and objective:  
Representationalism in cognitive and socio-cultural theory. 
 
Alan Costall 
Department of Psychology,  
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Portsmouth, PO1 2DY 
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Although critics have long voiced fundamental objections to 'representational theory' within perceptual 
and cognitive theory, it is  only recently that its limitations have been widely acknowledged, such  as, 
the 'symbol ground problem' and the failure to explain how rules  and representations can be applied to 
specific situations. However,  in its opposition to the stark individualism of standard cognitive theory,  
socio-cultural psychology and related approaches have seemed to offer a  radical and promising 
alternative.  Yet, representationalism is also remarkably widespread within socio-cultural theory.  So 
why is  representationalism, despite all its difficulties, so prevalent within  the human sciences?  
Drawing upon the work of John Dewey and James Gibson, I will argue that representationalism is a 
consequence of a more fundamental commitment of cognitivism: the antithesis of the  subjective and 
objective, and the relegation of meaning either  to  individual  'mental representations' or else to 
collective symbolic  systems.  If we are to move beyond 'pre-post-cognitivism', we will need to reject 
the subject-object dualism that keeps raising the seemingly  fundamental 'problems' for which 
representationalism appears the only  'solution'. 
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In this paper we contrast the traditional cognitivist approach to representation (hereafter choc) with one 
based on a more transactional view (troc). On the first, some form of representation has seemed 
necessary in order to maintain contact causality (choc). John Dewey (1896) suggested the possibility of 
a radically different view. More recently, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) and James Gibson (1979) 
independently arrived at a view that the instantaneously present has no priority in perception, as is 
implied by the doctrine of choc.  To deny that mental representations form the basis of human thought 
and action is, of course, not to deny that representations are pervasive in modern human life. But they 
are themselves in need of explanation. How is this to be done? A start towards answering this question 
was made by Ed Reed and we review his notion of representational systems (Reed, 1991, 1996).   The 
representational power of an artifact does not stem from the object taken in isolation, but from its part in 
a cultural system. In developing Reed’s work we  borrow from the art historian Michael Baxandall the 
term troc (Baxandall, 1985). This underpins the relationship between an individual painter and his or 
her contemporary culture. It means exchange or barter, and unlike choc, troc is inconceivable in 
isolation.  It is always part of a system of exchange, and this can be generalized to include exchange 
between organism and environment. In this general form, sometimes it involves the use of 
representations, sometimes not.  Representations are used and evolve in the service of troc and this 
frame can in principle give a full account of the use of representations. Much recent work in the 
philosophy and sociology of  science indeed attests to the social and embodied nature of the 
representational practices which lie at the heart of this notion of troc (Lynch & Woolgar, 1990 ; Rouse,  
1996; Nersessian, 2005). The notion of troc also reflects the mutualist ontology we have elaborated 
elsewhere (Still & Good, 1998).   
 
References 
 
Baxandall, M. (1985) Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation of Pictures. Yale: Yale 
University Press. 
Dewey, J. (1896) The reflex arc concept in psychology. Psychological Review, 3, 357-370. 
Gibson, J.J. (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.  
Lynch, M. & Woolgar, S. (eds) (1990) Representation in Scientific Practice. London: MIT Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomeology of Perception. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
Nersessian, N.J. (2005) Interpreting scientific and engineering practices: Integrating the cognitive, 
social, and cultural dimensions.  In M. Gorman, R. Tweney, D. Gooding, & A. Kincannon (eds), New 
Directions in Scientific and Technical Thinking Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Reed, E.  (1991) James Gibson's ecological approach to cognition. In A.W. Still & A. Costall (eds), 
Against Cognitivism: Alternative Foundations for Cognitive Psychology (pp. 171-197). Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 42
Reed, E.  (1996). Encountering the World: Toward an Ecological Psychology. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Rouse, J. (1991)  Philosophy of Science and the persistent narratives of modernity. Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Science, 22, 141-162. 
Rouse, J. (1996). Engaging Science: How to Understand its Practices Philosophically. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.  
Still, A. & Good, J. (1998) The ontology of mutualism. Ecological Psychology, 10, 39-63. 
 43
The distribution of representation 
 
Lisa M. Osbeck 
Department of Psychology 
University of West Georgia 
losbeck@westga.edu 
 
Nancy J. Nersessian 
Program in Cognitive Science 
College of Computing 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
Atlanta, Georgia 30332 
nancyn@cc.gatech.edu 
 
Perceptions of impasse between cognitive and social-cultural accounts of science practice detract from 
the effort to provide rich and satisfying accounts of scientific knowledge production. Accounts are 
required that move beyond both the ‘black-boxing’ of cognition and the compartmentalizing of the 
social and cultural as ‘elements’ that ‘enter in’ to the analysis of scientific practice at definable points 
(Longino, 2002; Nersessian, 2005).  Such integration requires nothing less than to reconceptualize both 
‘cognition’ and ‘culture’ such that each is implicated in the other.  Newer paradigms of cognitive 
science attempt just this, broadening the boundaries of the epistemic system to encompass networks of 
interacting persons, shared resources (including technology) and traditions of practice (e.g, Hutchins 
1995, Greeno 1998).  Reconceptualizing cognition as distributed requires either discarding traditional 
cognitive concepts such as representation, or reconceptualizing them as well.  We believe that the 
notion of ‘representation’ is useful to a coherent account of scientific innovation and conceptual 
change.  However, traditional accounts of representation focus principally upon internal (mental) 
representation.  Among the many reasons this is problematic is that external representations (such as 
diagrams) seem to provide the scaffolding for science (Giere, 2002).  This paper thus strives to 
articulate new ways of understanding ‘representation’ in science that are compatible with a distributed 
cognitive framework.  We draw upon a wide-scale, multi-year project that uses ethnographic and 
cognitive-historical methodology to investigate the ‘social-cognitive-cultural’ practices of 
interdisciplinary research laboratories.  We construe each laboratory as an ‘evolving distributed 
cognitive system’ within a dynamic ‘problem space.’ Ethnographic field notes and interviews with 
scientists at varying levels and stages of experience have led us to develop new interpretive concepts 
that include internal/external representational ‘coupling’, ‘distributed model-based reasoning’, and 
‘cognitive partnerships’ among persons and with artifacts.  We examine representation’s nature and 
specific roles in a distributed system in relation to these concepts, and consider possible constraints 
upon a description of representation as distributed. 
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Symposium abstract 
What is cognition? Interestingly, this question does not have a ready answer. During the rise of 
cognitive science, cognition was used in a loose way to refer to a host of processes, including 
perception, rationality, memory, and action. Roughly, the criterion for anything being considered 
‘cognitive’ was whether it related to some aspect of human mentality, with common sense intuitions 
acting as a judge. Thus arose the situation where it became a matter of painstaking research and debate 
whether or not certain animals exhibit cognition (Allen & Bekoff, 1997), while chess-playing AI-
programs were assumed to fall within the cognitive domain.  
 
The rise of embodied cognition, with its intrinsically evolutionary perspective, shifted the emphasis 
away from complex human processes as the paradigm. The new examples consist of insect-like robots, 
the dynamical modeling of perception-action coupling,  sensorimotor coordination, and so on. While 
these are clearly examples of intelligent problem solving—the necessary preconditions for human 
cognition—the relation to the human mind is sometimes tentative at best.  In an increasingly mosaic 
picture, however, the lack of a clear theoretical construct becomes more problematical. What do we 
take cognition to be? How are we even to approach such a question? 
 
One important upshot of embodied cognition is that the basis of cognition shifts from human rationality 
to perception-action coupling in general. Agency thus becomes plausibly cast as the key feature of 
cognition. For psychology, human agency is of course the core topic, and recent years have seen 
increased attention to the conceptual foundations of agency. However, agency (like cognition) is often 
interpreted in an anthropocentric manner, which induces an artificial dichotomy between genuine 
cognizers/agents and reflexive/instinctive organisms. Thus the question of the minimal requirements 
for cognition remains open and unresolved. 
 
In this symposium we aim to contribute to these foundational issues from a more biologically oriented 
perspective, which seeks the bounds of cognition among the lower branches of the phylogenetic tree. 
The first paper will first introduce the problem of formulating a conceptual foundation for cognition 
and put forward the option of casting agency—perception-action coupling—as the physical and 
conceptual basis. The other two papers will develop this theme in more detail. The second paper will 
discuss recent and highly surprising discoveries concerning bacterial intelligence and their import for 
the notion of cognition. The third paper will discuss to what extent nervous systems might be 
considered as a necessary component to turn metabolic activity into cognitive agency. 
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What is cognition? Despite the existence of a science of cognition there is no clear agreement on what 
makes certain phenomena cognitive, and others not. Within cognitivism the issue was neglected. 
Human intelligence was used as a standard, and any process—natural or artificial—that fitted this 
standard sufficiently could be considered ‘cognitive’. For post-cognitivist psychology the situation is 
different. It cannot rely on the ‘human standard’ in the same way. One might even say that the need for 
a post-cognitivist psychology arose because cognitivism began with this most complex of all cognitive 
systems without a good understanding and appreciation of more basic, biological cases.  Embodied 
cognition approaches remedy this anthropocentric bias by addressing a more varied set of processes 
that are not strictly limited to humans. Under these circumstances the question what we take cognition 
to be is more urgent. Are phenomena like insect walking (Brooks) and goal-seeking missiles (O’Regan 
and Noë) examples of cognition or not? What criteria do we use to answer such questions? Given this 
problem, the notion of perception-action coupling (or sensorimotor contingencies) becomes an 
important and fairly obvious option to provide a foundation for the notion of cognition. However, and 
intriguingly, the same problem occurs again: What are perception-action couplings? What would make 
something an example of perception-action coupling? Where are we to draw a line, if anywhere? It is 
self-evident that O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) example of a goal-seeking missile is controversial, but 
why exactly? What is missing? Can we ever do more than making intuitive judgments here? A way out 
of this dilemma may be found by developing the claim that perception-action coupling must be 
grounded in a biological context (Keijzer, 2001), and following what Lyon (2005) calls a biogenic 
approach. This option raises a whole new field of issues and topics that is of central concern for a post-
cognitivist psychology. 
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Abstract to follow. 
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We analyze the conditions for the origin and evolution of agency. Starting from basic (prebiotic) 
autonomous systems, agency appears as an interactive process sustained by the internal self-
constructive organization. At this minimal level, however, self-construction and interaction are not 
separable processes. The next step is living unicellular systems, in which the adaptive form of agency 
appears. Adaptive agency requires a certain decoupling from strict constructive processes, but both are 
supported by the same metabolic organization. A crucial step in the evolution of agency appears when 
behavioral and constructive processes get functionally separated. This fact is related to the size increase 
of some groups of organisms whose adaptive abilities depend on motility. Here a specialized 
(sub)system develops which, in the sensorimotor aspect, is hierarchically decoupled from the metabolic 
organization, although it remains dependent of it in the global functioning of the organism. This 
hierarchical decoupling is what allows the unfolding of an unlimited complexity of agency and 
therefore, the emergence of cognition. 
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